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重要问题，我们有必要对保险代理人的行为从制度源头来探根究底。   



























   Abstract 
 
In the early 1990s, as insurance agent system was introduced in our 
country, it was popularized rapidly．Insurance agent system is the most 
important marketing way in our insurance market at present，and it plays 
positive role on the development of China insurance industry．  
However，under this system，because of the principal-agent relationship 
between insurers and insurance agents，there are conflicts of interest and 
asymmetric information between them，which cause plenty of moral hazard 
and adverse selection of insurance agents．It not only dose damage to the 
interests of insurers and the insured，but also increases the risk of insurance 
management．Therefore, the effective management of insurance agents is one 
of the major issues of insurance industry in China，and it is necessary to 
research on the theoretical reasons for insurance agents’ activities． 
By investigating the insurance agent system in China， the paper 
analyses dishonest phenomenon of insurance agents．Then，it analyses the 
theoretical reasons for insurance agent problems based on the principal- 
agency theory and the asymmetric information theory．According to 
principal-agency theory, the solution to principal-agency problems is to 
establish an effective incentive mechanism．In current，the incentive contract 
is not very reasonable in China，which pays attention to the quantity of  
policy but the quality．Considering recessive incentive factors such as the 
quality of policy，prestige and so on，the paper builds up the two-factor 
incentive mechanism model using basic principal-agency models, and it 
discusses the conclusions of two situations, including symmetric information 
and asymmetric information．In the end，it raises several suggestions to 
consummate the insurance agent system of our country，such as improving 
the existing training system of insurance agents，establishing the individual 
credit appraisal system，adding fixed income，raising the rate of commission 
suitably，implementing recessive incentive measures and making long-term 
contracts，etc． 
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